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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.*
During 1962 the Supreme Court of Colorado rendered decisions
which involved several significant interpretations of the rules of
evidence. This review will attempt an analysis of these cases in the
respective categories involved. Consistent with the intent of this
one year review, no reference will be made to cases applying rules
of evidence in orthodox fashion to the frequently recurring situa-
tion presented by the ordinary trial. Rather, the cases selected
for discussion are those which appear to decide a novel question
before this court.
The use of demonstrative evidence came in for the usual ob-
jections that it is too inflammatory and prejudicial, but in each
instance the supreme court found that the evidence served a legi-
timate purpose and that its use was proper.
In Wooley v. People,' objection was made to the admission of
certain photographs of the body of Wooley's alleged victim, and
also to a photograph of Wooley in the act of demonstrating to the
police officers exactly how he had committed the crime. Wooley
had made this demonstration following his confession, but at the
trial he contended that the shooting was accidental. The photograph
indicated that the shooting was intentional.
As to the admission of the photographs of the body, it showed
two things which were essential to the prosecution's case. The
first was the wound in the head, which was the handiwork of
Wooley; the other, the state of decomposition which resulted from
Wooley's attempt to conceal the body. The photographs corroborated
both Wooley's confession and other testimony as to the nature of
the wound and of the disposition of the body. Obviously the photo-
graphs brought vividly before the jury the details of the crime. But
the court held that the photographs were admissible, being "com-
petent evidence of anything which it is competent for a witness
to describe in words,"2 and that their shocking nature would not
make necessary their exclusion, since they disclosed only conditions
which were the direct result of Wooley's action and which were
relevant to the issue in the case.
As to the photograph of Wooley's demonstration to the officers,
the court pointed out that since there was no suggestion that an eye
witness could not relate what he had seen Wooley do in the demon-
stration, the photograph not only corroborated what such eye
witnesses had said, but also gave meaning to the demonstration.
There was no error, therefore, in receiving the photograph in
evidence. This was particularly true since the photograph indicated
an intentional act, whereas the testimony offered on behalf of
Wooley indicated that it was accidental.
This case clarifies considerably the role which demonstrative
evidence may play in substantiating verbal testimony, even though
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1962).
2 Id. at 907.
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such evidence may portray the facts much more vividly than might
be necessary to establish the existence of such facts. The evidence
is not to be excluded merely because the situation shown might be
established by words alone.
This aspect of the law as to demonstrative evidence was devel-
oped still further by the supreme court in the case of People v.
Spinuzzi.3 This was a writ of error pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §
39-7-27 (1953) on behalf of the people for a review of a decision of
the trial court on questions of law. Testimony at the trial was to
the effect that the deceased fell, with defendant on top of him;
that defendant had a gun in his hand; that deceased was holding
his hand in front of his face; that death was caused by a bullet in
deceased's brain; that a shot was fired at that time and that there
was no other shot fired on the occasion and, finally, that the
bullet which lodged in deceased's brain and caused his death had
passed through the palm of deceased's hand, and that this hand
bore powder burns where the bullet entered. During the prosecu-
tion's case the district attorney offered in evidence a photograph
of deceased's body to establish his identify and also to show the
bullet hole in the hand and in the skull, as well as to illustrate the
path which the bullet took, but the trial court restricted the use of
the photograph to the question of identity. This was held to be
error, since it has been consistently held, in Color-ado, "that photo-
graphs are competent evidence of anything which it is competent
for a witness to describe in words."'4 The court held that the prose-
cution was entitled to have the jury observe the picture as a por-
trayal of the bullet wounds, even though they had already been
described by the testimony of witnesses.
The rule as to the use of demonstrative evidence was succinctly
stated by the court in Jensen v. South Adams County Water and
San. Dist.,5 as follows: "Where the only purpose of a photograph is
to inflame the jury, the pictures should be excluded. But where, as
here, they portray the injury caused by the accident, they may not
be excluded on the sole ground that they have 'emotional over-
tones' or will be embarrassing.
6
A frequently recurring problem arises as to the admissibility of
evidence of separate and distinct offenses of a similar nature to
that of the offense which is involved in the trial, where such evi-
dence is offered to prove the existence of an intent, plan, scheme,
or to establish identity. In Wooley v. People.7 a variation on this
rather common situation arose. To prove a motive for the felonious
killing, the prosecution offered evidence of another but completely
dissimilar offense. This evidence related to Wooley's cashing of a
number of checks payable to the victim of the homicide and deliv-
ered to his residence after his death. Wooley succeeded in cashing
these checks by devious means, including forgery, and realized
about $1400 from them. The court held that the usual rule as to the
admissibility of evidence of other similar offenses did not apply
to this situation, but that this evidence was admissible as an inte-
t 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
4 Id. at 431.
5 368 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1962).
6 Id. at 212.
7 Note I supro.
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gral part of the total picture surrounding the homicide, to establish
the motive for the offense-to kill the victim for profit.
In connection with the use of evidence of separate offenses the
court decided a question of first impression in this state in Bizup v.
People.8 Here the defendant contended that evidence of the separate
but related offenses was inadmissible because he had confessed to
them and that the only purpose of introducing the evidence was
to prejudice the jury by making the killing appear more heinous.
The court rejected this contention with the comment that "an
admission by a defendant does not prevent the state from present-
ing separate and independent proof of the fact admitted."9
What appears to be a question of first impression in Colorado
was involved in Jordan v. People.'0 Here a statement made by
the defendant had been reduced to writing but the defendant had
refused to either read it or sign it, so its admission as a confession
was denied. After establishing its admissibility by showing the
basic facts required to make the statement admissible as a past
recollection recorded, however, the statement was read to the jury,
in its entirety. To this procedure the defendant objected because,
he insisted, the witness must first be shown the writing and must
state that it does not revive his recollection, before the writing
may be read to the jury. The witness was not asked, and he did
not state, whether the document revived his present recollection.
The court disapproved any rule which requires that the absence
of a present recollection must be shown as a preliminary to the
introduction of past recollection recorded, and relied upon a s tate--
ment by Professor Wigmore, which, in pertinent part, is as follows:
Is the use of past recollection necessary (1) because in the
case in hand there is not available a present actual recollec-
tion in the specific witness, or (2) because in the usual case
a faithful record of past recollection, if it exists, is more
trustworthy and desirable than a present recollection of
greater or less vividness?
The latter view, it would seem, is more in harmony
with general experience, as well as with the attitude of the
judges who early vindicated the use of past recollection. A
faithful memorandum is acceptable, not conditionally on
the total or partial absence of a present remnant of actual
recollection in the particular witness, but unconditionally;
because, for every moment of time which elapses between
the act of recording and the occasion of testifying, the ac-
tual recollection must be inferior in vividness to the recol-
lection perpetuated in the record."
The court added that testimony of admissions of the accused
should be accurate and that the exact words contained in the
writing would obviously be more reliable. The court then enun-
ciated the general rule applicable to such situations in the
following words: "We are persuaded that the admissibility of a
past recollection recorded does not depend upon the absence of
8 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962).
9 Id. at 789.
10 376 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1962).
It 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 738 (3d ed. 1940).
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a present recollection.' 2 This rule makes admissible the authen-
ticated writing, in the first instance, whether the situation is one
in which the witness would be likely to have an independent re-
collection or not and this becomes a matter of irrelevant inquiry.
For the first time the supreme court had occasion to consider
the reach of the extremely important decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio.13 It was urged by the defendant,
in Peters v. People,1 4 that certain evidence admitted against the
accused had been secured in violation of the safeguards set up in
Mapp. A motion in the trial court that the accused be permitted to
offer testimony to show the circumstances connected with the
search and seizure was denied. The accused argued that this con-
stituted reversible error.
Unfortunately for the enlightenment of the bar, the court
determined that the evidence clearly indicated a permissive searcb
and that there was nothing whatever in the record to indicate an
unreasonable search and seizure, within the proscription of Mapp.
The only indication of the attitude which may be adopted by the
court as to a definition of "unreasonable" is to be found in certain
language, which is clearly dictum, as follows:
We conclude that the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States went no further than to exclude in the
state courts the use of evidence obtained by way of an un-
reasonable search and seizure as forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. It does not
exclude all evidence which might be obtained as an inci-
dent to a lawful arrest, nor does it preclude the admission
of all evidence which may have been obtained without the
sanction of a search warrant.1'5
The court was not required to answer the much debated ques-
tion as to whether the state court may set up its own standards of
reasonableness, or whether the state is bound to follow the same
standards established by the federal courts in proceedings in those
courts. This answer must be forthcoming in another case at another
day and only the Supreme Court of the United States can finally
resolve the question.
12 Note 10 supra ot 703.
13 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962).
15 Id. at 175.
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